CRYENAICAN WITHDRAWAL 31 MARCH – 10 APRIL 1941

8 Dec 1941

Prepared by SGT Oates J.R.

No.5 Fd Unit M.H. & J.

Reference: RACMP Museum, 2002

In the headlong rush from El Aghoila to the confines of Tobruk the 9 Division Provost payed an important part in restoring some semblance of order in the convoys, particularly after they took complete control from Derna onwards.

The information in this document was obtained from the diary of a Lieutenant of 9 Div Provosts and it is an indictment against British C.M.P’s, some of whom went straight through to Alexandria without a care about Tobruk.

The hero of these activities of 9 Aust Div Provosts was LT A. Preston, who commanded a section and is now a prisoner of war. It was mainly due to his daring and enterprise that 1120 personnel in convoy reached Tobruk Fortress safely.

Although it was rumoured on 31 March 1941 that British forward forces would eventually withdraw back to the defences of Tobruk, it was decided that 9 Aust Div Provosts must go on up to Barce from Tobruk. When they arrived at Barce they had great difficulty to find bullets. Crycom (Cyrensican Command) had commandeered most of the buildings and 9 Div Provosts had to seek temporary shelter in sheds with the Libyan Labor Battalion. Conditions in these were far from hygienic. On this date, 2 April, two provost’s trucks overturned 90 kilometers from Barce and two personnel were killed.

The trouble to secure proper burial for these men provides an interesting sidelight. The C.C.S. authorities would not allow their burial in the Hospital grounds, and ordered the removal of the bodies to the custody of the unit. Cyrcom did not know of any place but the Arab Cemetery. Graves registration worked only on paper. The town Major was new to his job. The Brigadier of Administration Cyrcom, finally induced his ADMS to order the burials in the Hospital grounds. This procedure took 11 hours.

In the meantime a report had come through from Division that a withdrawal had been ordered to defensive positions between Barce and Derna. Then came the report that the enemy had outflanked our ambush (2/13 Bn) at er-Regima.

2 Armoured Division (British) had been left stranded between Soluch and Benina by their guiding company of C.M.P’s. LT Preston and six men from his section went forward from El Abair to Benina and contacted the C.O.C. 2 Armoured Division. Evidently the Division was unable to give battle owing to their AFV’s being in bad repair. The brigades had been instructed to withdraw to the north, but owing to the lack of C.M.P. guides the whole Division had become scattered over a wide area north of Soluch.

9 Div Pro posted guides on all roads and directed columns of 2 Armoured Div, to the to of the escarpment at er-Regima. This task was not completed because of the near approach of the enemy early on the morning of 4 April.

The Unit’s war equipment had been stacked ready for destruction and, in the meantime, sections were employed in traffic control duties, directing convoys to the Derna Road.

Cyrcom had decided to make a stand 30 kilometres from Barce on the Derna Road. All English units were to prepare for battle there and Australian units were to take up positions east of Derna. Transport had not arrived from 9 Div Camp Commandant and Cyrcom did not have any to go beyond the 30 kilometer post. Eventually a Fiat 36 seater bus was stolen by 9 Div Prov. The unit was then able to take a good quantity of equipment from Barce. Petrol was poured on the remainder and fired.

At this stage, according to reports, things looked bad for the 20th Brigade which was fighting the rearguard action beyond Barce.

Before the unit left Barce a fire was investigated just beyond Cyrcom HQ. It turned out to be an English unit burning secret papers in a 15 cwt desert buggy. The truck was in good condition and contained two Brens and two Boyes A/T rifles. The fire was raked on to the ground by 9 Div Prov personnel, and an argument occurred. The English troops claiming that pieces of undestroyed paper would be blown about. The secret papers were three maps of Italian origin.

All along the road to Derna there were overturned vehicles of all description, and no effort had been made to render half of them immobile. The pace of the convoy was as fast as possible. At the top of the escarpment, five miles from Derna, several vehicles had shot over the edge of the road to fall a sheer 100 ft in places.

At the brickworks the OC, CAPT Rainsbury, was contacted and the unit travelled on towards Derna where traffic was hopelessly jammed owing to vehicles breaking down on the steep escarpment road east of Derna. Control posts were organised by 9 Aust Div Provosts, and in a surprisingly short time the convoy was on the move again.

The only administrative staff in Derna was the Town Major, a company of 2/1 Pioneers, and one company of infantry as Security Guard. No arrangements had been made for the control of traffic. The C.M.P. Command had withdrawn to Tobruk, or so it was thought at this stage. 9 Aust Advance Division was contacted and all Australian units were sent across the desert from Giovani Berta to Matuba. The unit posted 12 MP'’ as directors from Berta to the Tobruk Road at Tmimi. The men stopped at their posts for 24 hours without being relieved. Another section of MP’s acted as guides from Giovani Berta to Derna Aerodrome through the town.

Late on 4 April telephonic orders were received by 9 Div Pro from G.O.C. Cyrcom, to the effect that the unit would remain and hold Derna until the enemy appeared. No further orders from Cyrcom were received.

It was reported in Derna on 6 April that enemy armoured units had driven Crycom attendant units back towards Derna and that LTGENs’ O’Connor and Neame had been captured.

By this time utter chaos was steeping through the moving convoys. Hurried preparations were made to mine the road on both east and west escarpments at Derna. Green flares were seen at the bottom of the west escarpment and, shortly afterwards, at 2300 hrs, it was reported that enemy AFV’s were approaching the top of the east escarpment. It appeared then that Derna was likely to be cut off at the aerodrome.

The day of greatest activity in the withdrawal was on 7 April. Just after midnight 9 Aust Div warned all units at Derna to withdraw to Tobruk. Provosts patrols were sent out as guides and all units except the D.I.D. and Security Guard, left almost immediately. The guard had about 450 Italian POW and 24 civilians in the local gaol.

Two MP volunteers were sent to Giovani Berta to warn a unit of English RE’s to withdraw across the desert.

Transport was available to move any more troops out of Derna and Provost Unit baggage was ferried to the aerodrome (still free of enemy) in an Italian vehicle. Most of the Security Guard had to march out on foot. Several English staff cars were stopped. Often they contained one officer driving alone. Their hurry was great and they refused to take any of the marching troops. Strong measures had to be used by the Provost at times. A sound ‘cussing’ usually sufficed. One English Captain, all alone in a Humber, could not possible drive in the dark without lights and it was not the thing for troops to ride in staff cars.

The headlamps were smashed with a hammer and six Australian OR’s climbed into the car before it drove off.

One English Major was almost grief-stricken when four US tanks were tipped over the escarpment. He thought that they should be towed to Tobruk for repairs.

At the direction of GHQ the Provost Unit was to take back two important Italian civilian prisoners. One was Domini, said to be a leader in Libyan-Italian politics. Orders were that they were not to contact the enemy and Domini tried the fatal mistake of doing so.

It was at this stage that Cyrcom went ahead of the withdrawal and 9 Aust Div took over the complete administration.

In the meantime enemy AFV’s were harassing the convoys near Derna Aerodrome and endeavouring to cut the road.

At 0300 hrs, CAPT Rainsbury left for Tmimi to disperse forces, and at 0330 hrs, Provost HQ were ready to move to Tobruk. A four-ton Italian truck was loaded with eight men and unit equipment, but owing to the oncoming traffic, it was forced off the road (not cleared until 0600 hrs – reached Tobruk at 1630 hrs).

An ambulance passing empty was stopped and turned back to pick up a patrol of eight on the west escarpment. The remaining Italian civilian prisoner was transferred to a passing truck and was eventually handed over to the FSS at Tobruk. Several Security Guard men had to be left at the gaol at Derna, but they got through to Tobruk.

CAPT Rainsbury and his party did a great job in dispersal work at Primi and had convoys moving through freely for 16 hours. In fact, from the time that 9 Aust Div took command the withdrawal ran more smoothly.

Earlier in the day (7 April) LT Preston had left Advance HQ to bring back his men who were in one way occupied territory beyond Derna.

At 0830 hrs he met a large convoy of stragglers in charge of SGT Coss. While they were having breakfast the enemy appeared from the direction of Mechili in strong force. Twelve heavy tanks and several light AFV’s were coming down a wide wadi towards the junction of the Derna-Mechili Roads. The 2/15 Bn were in a defensive position in the wadi fighting a rearguard action and, during the engagement, LT Preston led the convoy back to Giovani Berta. At that place, enemy AFV’s were again encountered, but the convoy was able to outdistance them.

Shortly afterwards the convoy was machine-gunned from the air, but got through unscathed. The whole area west of Tmimi was reported to be in enemy hands at this stage.

The west and east passes into and out of Derna had been blown by the 2/1 Pioneer Bn and were reported to be impassible, but it seemed that LT Preston’s only chance was to get his convoy to safety through Derna.

He made a quick reconnaissance at 1630 hrs and discovered that the road down the western escarpment could be repaired. After one hours hard work the convoy of stragglers, 125 vehicles and 1200 personnel were able to reach Derna. The town was quiet and no enemy were sighted. After more repairs to roads the convoy moved through Derna and at 1920 hrs the leading vehicles were attacked by ground troops at Derna Aerodrome. The three leading vehicles were soon stopped by enemy action and the remainder of the convoy halted about half a mile down the road.

LT Preston sent one of his men back to warn the convoy that the enemy were in force. This man LCPL Maddox was the last to see LT Preston, who had left his vehicle and was engaging the enemy with his pistol. After Maddox had delivered his message a strong rifle and grenade party went forward and forced the enemy to withdraw. Later the scene of action was searched, but there was no sign of dead or wounded. The enemy took LT Preston and their wounded with them. At midday on 8 April, SGT Goss and three OR’s arrived in Tobruk with the stragglers convoy of 108 vehicles and approximately 1100 personnel. It was then reported that LCPL W.R. Williams was also taken prisoner the previous night.

During the following day others of 9 Div Prov straggled in to Tobruk. LCPLs Cole and Coady, who volunteered to warn English RE’s at Berta, reported in at 2130 hrs. They were both in a bad state. They had been surprised by the enemy along the road and were forced to follow the coastline on foot. They delivered their messages at Berta, but the enemy cut the English units off during their withdrawal.