FROM : Service Police Unit, Netherlands Section

TO : Headquarters, First Tactical Air Force

DATE : 11^th May 1945

REF : 2/17/1B (99A)

1. The most notable feature of OBOE 1 from the Service police point of view was the chaos of traffic generally.

2. It is well to note that between H hour on Tuesday, May 1^st, and 2100 hrs on Wednesday, May 2^nd, it was estimated that just short of 1500 vehicles passed along Anzac Highway. Admittedly some, possibly many, vehicles passed the given point on several occasions but this does not decrease the numbers, it aggravates it. It should also be borne in mind that the length of road during this time was approximately a mile on the first day and about two miles on the second day.

3. Because of this, it will be appreciated that the traffic problem for these two days at least, and in the opinion of the APM for the first five days, was the major one for the whole of the operation.

4. This traffic problem was caused by four factors, namely:

1. The unloading of Air Force vehicles.
2. The unloading of Air Force personnel.
3. Air Force personnel walking and riding around sight-seeing.
4. The shortage of roadway distance with no possible parking area.

5. It is surmised by the APM that the initial cause of this congestion boiled down to one factor, namely lack of shipping. The APM is ignorant if this really was the cse, but judged it to be so by his observations.

6. Dealing with the four points individually:-

1. The unloading of Air Force vehicles.
2. Unloading of Air Force personnel may be taken in conjunction with (1).

Was it necessary to unload Air Force at all for at least the first two days? Shortage of shipping would naturally make this necessary. If it had been possible (and the APM is not aware of what the shipping necessities were for unloading so prematurely) the Air Force units should never have been unloaded till the third day, least of all ‘P’ Day. This applies particularly to the A.C.S. Because of this unloading point 4 was obvious, setbacks in the actual fighting limited the road area to a maximum of two miles on Anzac Highway till late May 3^rd. Because of the nature of the ground, no parking facilities existed for the huge number of Air Force vehicles which were unloaded. Keeping Anzac Highway open and clear for traffic carrying supplies to front line troops, evacuation of casualties and the like, was of major importance. Yet Anzac Highway was the only place where these vehicles could be parked. As stated there were only one or two paddocks where vehicles could be parked, and these paddocks were by no means suitable for parking vehicles, particularly the heavy ones which were numerous. This led to the only possible way out, to push vehicles off the road anywhere and everywhere, every spot possible and trust to luck it did not rain and that not too much difficulty would be experienced in extracting them. It is believed that luckily no great difficulty was experienced when eventually these vehicles could be moved to their proper sites. The numbers of vehicles made it necessary to keep bringing them up Anzac Highway as near behind the front line troops as the Army would allow. On two occasions, these parked vehicles were so close behind the front line troops that a setback of our troops by the enemy could have meant a colossal loss to the RAAF of equipment and vehicles. Also on one occasion at least, supplies to front line troops and evacuation of wounded was, of necessity, held up because of traffic congestion. Damage to the road which of course could not be obviated was another factor causing congestion.

7. The third point, sightseeing, was a major problem, which could not be efficiently policed, and one which should never have arisen. Hundreds of Air Force personnel were landed on ‘P’ Day. The allotted transit site was not cleared of enemy till late May 4^th. Therefore these personnel were placed by the APM in the only available spot, a bit of clearing near what was evidently once a wireless station and practically opposite Bourke Highway off Anzac Highway. These personnel after dumping their gear proceeded on a sight-seeing tour of the area cleared. Many people were on the Anzac Highway, narrow enough for traffic as it was, and caused a major factor in congestion. Vehicles passing one another and also to content with hundreds of walking personnel. When these personnel found abandoned bicycles, the position became almost beyond human control. Although no specific cases could be discovered it was very strongly suspected that Air Force personnel also did a sight-seeing tour in vehicles.

8. If lack of shipping was the initial cause of the congestion then the APM cannot offer any solution.

9. If shipping is not the cause, then the following points are suggested:-

1. No Air Force personnel are allowed to disembark until the responsible Army authority gives a clearing signal. Naturally this does not apply to Service policemen, T.M.O., air support, communications and the like; but it cannot be seen why O.B.U.’s, Squadrons, A.C.S.’s, Wings etc. should be disembarked until such time as their sites, and in the case of A.C.S.’s the aerodrome, are available, even if it meant sitting in the boats for an extra two days. Then when their sites are clear they could disembark, move directly to their camp sites, or the drome, thus ensuring a smooth flow of traffic. The APM appreciates that this would be subject to enemy resistance but suggests that this resistance if similar to that met in OBOE 1, is all the more reason for withholding Air Force personnel and vehicles off the road.
2. Units should be instructed and made to realise most forcibly that once members of their units are in the transit area, or camp site, they are not to leave their places until such time as the initial traffic problem has eased. Personnel would find it irksome to be confined for perhaps a few days; but in comparison to the necessity for this action, their restricted movement is of little consequence. Until such time as a traffic circuit is established, a minimum of road traffic is most essential. Judging by photos and intelligence reports, the roads on OBOE 6 are very narrow, and a one-way traffic system will have to be introduced as soon as the area is cleared of resistance, therefore it is imperative that pedestrians and unnecessary vehicles should be compelled to keep off the road.