Page 1
Go to Despatch
Page 2
The Club welcomes all
to come along and play or just watch.
Come and enjoy.
The game play can be intense.
|
|
nswc DESPATCH
Page 3
Last Update 30/May/2009
A Quarterly Newsletter Published by the Northern Sydney Wargames Club
The Russian Navy in WWI
The Baltic
by Stephen Thomas
The invasion force left port on 5th April, 22 transports carrying 2 brigades of troops.
They had a close escort of destroyers and cruisers and three seaplane carriers provided
aerial reconnaissance to scout the transit area for enemy ships and U-boats. Further off,
two Task Forces, each consisting of a modern battleship and fast destroyers, provided
support. There was no real threat though; the sole German battlecruiser was not prepared
to challenge the superior modern battleships. The unopposed landing on the Turkish coast
led to the capture of a small but valuable port. All in all, it was a skillfully managed
operation, with specially designed landing barges, clearly marked beaches, anti submarine
patrols and nets.
Encouraged by this success, further landings took place, culminating with the landing of
34,000 troops next to the major Turkish port in the area. With their main defences turned,
the Turkish army fell back, giving up this vital port.
No, it’s not some hypothetical British success at Gallipoli. It’s a description
of the activities of one of the most underrated navies of World War One – the
Russian. Far from the popular image of incompetence and inferiority the Russian navy in
both the Baltic and the Black Sea was competent, well led, aggressive and one of the most
active navies of the war.
The Baltic
Background
The Baltic was a rather more complex naval front than is generally appreciated. There were
major geographical considerations that affected activities for both sides and oddly
enough, both sides felt they were the inferior force! Overall, the German navy was vastly
superior to the Russian but they regarded the North Sea as the key naval front. As a
result, the Baltic had a very low priority and German naval forces there were actually
quite weak. They could however quickly transfer ships from the North Sea if they needed
to. Thus while the Russians had a small local superiority they knew if they ever became a
major threat the Germans could bring in major reinforcements.
The Russians in particular operated under a number of constraints. The major fear, given
the German ability to deploy major naval forces in the Baltic, was of an invasion that
would threaten St Petersburg, Russia's capital. The position of Sweden had to be
considered, as there was a serious concern that Sweden might side with Germany and the
Russians could never risk provoking them. As a result, Swedish territorial waters were a
safe haven for German transports. The short range of their ships meant they were limited
to short raids or minelaying operations close to Germany or Sweden and it was not
practical to set up any kind of standing patrol or blockade. Finally, the defeat at
Tsushima had been a shattering blow and the Tsar was not prepared to risk another such
loss.
As a result, the Russian strategy was primarily defensive. Accordingly, they built up a
network of protective minefields in the Gulf of Finland which were supplemented by shore
batteries. The intention was to fight a form of trench warfare from behind the minefields.
Operations
At the start of the war, the Germans mined parts of the Kattegat. Concerned over their
neutrality the Danes and Swedes mined other sections. Fairly soon the channels became
virtually impassable for Allied surface ships, although the British were able to slip a
few submarines into the Baltic.
The Russian commander, Admiral Nikolai Essen[1], did his best to pursue an aggressive
policy. At first, this consisted primarily of minelaying. As fears of Swedish involvement
lessened, he was given more freedom. This enabled him to send out raiders and minelayers
further into the Baltic. In October 1914, the destroyers were laying minefields off Memel.
Given the relatively low number of ships available, neither side had a capacity to
exercise long term control. Missions were short term revolving around minelaying, convoy
raids, and shore bombardment. Such clashes that did occur came about during these missions
and were minor affairs with only a few cruisers and destroyers involved on each side.
Generally, damage was light but overall the Russians got the better of these encounters.
The Germans did bring some of their big ships into the Baltic for specific operations.
First in May 1915 to support an advance through Courland. Then in August 1915 they sent
eleven dreadnoughts into the Gulf of Riga. It took several days to clear the minefields
covering the entrance to the Gulf and this bought about a brief clash between the Posen
and Nassau against the Russian predreadnought Slava. Eventually they pushed through into
the Gulf. With poor weather and repeated Russian minelaying the Germans were compelled to
withdraw. As they did so, one of the British submarines torpedoed and damaged the Moltke.
Overall, the operation achieved little and risked too much.
Initially the Russian forces were commanded by Admiral Essen, possibly one of the best
naval commanders of the war, but he died in 1915. His successor Admiral Kanin was
competent but lacked his drive and aggression and was replaced in 1916 by the more
energetic, Admiral Nepenin.
Minelaying
Given the limitations on surface vessels both sides, particularly the Russians, used mines
both as a defensive and offensive weapon. Both sides had a number of minelayers and
destroyers sunk or damaged by mines. Overall, it was the Germans who suffered the most as
they also lost the armoured cruiser Friederich Carl in a minefield off Pillau in November
1914 and in December 1915 the light cruiser Bremen was sunk off Windau. A further three
German cruisers were damaged during the war.
Worst of all was a disastrous German destroyer attempt to raid Russian transports in the
Gulf of Finland in November 1916. A force of eleven destroyers ran into a minefield off a
Baltic Port and two were sunk initially. The raid continued and the destroyers carried out
a shore bombardment. On their way back they ran into the minefields again and a further
five destroyers were lost. It's a measure of the low profile of the Baltic front that this
loss of seven modern destroyers is virtually unknown.
Submarine warfare
At the start of the war, the Russians had 11 submarines in operation. Subsequently another
23 were completed but many arrived too late to be of any use. This didn't matter much as
they were all of inferior designs and achieved little. These were augmented by several
British submarines, which although dogged by torpedo failures, tended to be more
successful.
The British managed to get two E class submarines through the Kattegat in October 1914.
The whole affair was somewhat amateurish; they didn't even bother to tell the Russians the
submarines were being sent! Four more made the difficult journey in autumn 1915. One was
sunk but the other three slipped through. In July 1916, the British also sent four small C
class submarines to Archangel. From there they were shipped on barges by canal to the
Baltic arriving in September. When eventually put into service they were too old and small
to be of much use but their presence alone caused the Germans problems.
The latter half of 1915 was the submarines high point. In October 1915, the British E8
torpedoed the cruiser Prinz Adalbert off Libau, the magazines blew up, and virtually all
her crew were lost. Next month E19 torpedoed the light cruiser Undine in the western
Baltic. In addition, fourteen merchant ships sunk enroute from Sweden to Germany but
generally, these were nothing more than small coastal cargo vessels.
The effect though was significant and interestingly the Germans reacted in much the same
way the British did to the submarine threat. Shipping was suspended and they had to send
destroyers from the High Seas Fleet to provide extra escorts. Escorts were sent out on
useless anti submarine patrols and it created a general feeling of helplessness. Some
naval staff suggested sailing the merchant shipping in convoys but this was resisted as
being too difficult. It was Sweden which took the lead and she started running her own
ships in convoys to help protect their neutrality. With this example, the Germans switched
to running convoys as well. Largely as a result of these measures the submarines successes
dropped noticeably thereafter.
The Germans did deploy some U-boats in the area but their main focus was on the North
Atlantic. Their only real success came in October 1914. While patrolling the mouth of the
Gulf of Riga the Russian armoured cruiser Pallada was torpedoed by U26. Her magazines blew
up and she sank with 597 crewmembers[2].
By mid 1916, the Russian surface ships were conducting a number of raids on German
shipping coming from Sweden. This was hampered by the fact that the merchant ships could
spend most of the trip in Swedish waters; as a result, these raids only sank a few small
transports.
Things quickly started to fall apart in March 1917 as the revolution took hold. Nepenin
never got a chance to achieve much as he became an early casualty, being murdered in
March. Morale amongst the Russian sailors collapsed and most of the fleet became virtually
useless. Fortunately, the German naval activity generally remained at a low level. The
North Sea and submarine warfare were still their main focus
Operation Albion
The steady collapse of the Russian army did however bring about the biggest single naval
action of the Baltic war. The fall of Riga in September gave a real incentive to open up
the Gulf of Riga to shipping. To do this it was first necessary to capture the islands at
the mouth of the Gulf. Thus in October 1917 the Germans launched Operation Albion to
capture the islands. Part of the motivation was also to give the increasingly restive
fleet something to do and eleven battleships were detached to support the landings.
Knowing the strategic importance of the islands, they were well defended by the Russians
with a large garrison, minefields, and shore batteries. The waters were extremely
hazardous with tricky currents, narrow channels and numerous shallows. As a result, a
number of small German ships and one of the battleships ran aground during the operation.
The minefields covering the north of Osel Island presented a problem and the Germans found
it difficult to clear these. While moving in to bombard the shore batteries two
battleships, Bayern and Grosser Kurfurst, were damaged by mines, the former quite badly.
Despite this, they carried out their bombardment but were both withdrawn afterwards.
The initial landings on 12th at Tagga Bay met little resistance and the main forces were
quickly bought in. To cut the islands off the Germans also needed to control the
approaches from the Gulf of Finland and areas such as Moon Sound. German light ships tried
to force their way through the shallow Soela Sound between Dago and Osel Islands into Moon
Sound. Given the difficult waters and poor visibility, this was not easy. Over the next
few days, there were a series of skirmishes between destroyers and torpedo boats. The
Russians bought up the predreadnought's Slava and Grazhdanin plus some cruisers to drive
the Germans out but were unable to do so completely.
At the same time in the south German minesweepers spent several days clearing a passage
through the Irben Straits. Once again, several battleships were needed to suppress the
Russian shore battery covering the minefields. After three days, they broke through into
the Gulf. As part of the move to clear the Russian ships out of Moon Sound these forces
now attempted, on the 17th to clear the channel north from the Gulf into Moon Sound.
The minesweepers had to work forwards under fire from the Slava. The minesweepers were
supported by Koenig and Kronprinz and these two dreadnoughts should easily have been able
to defeat the Slava. Much to the Germans surprise, the old Slava's guns outranged those of
the modern battleships. Working under long range fire the minesweepers pushed forward
clearing a channel. Eventually the German battleships managed to move into range and
scored several hits on the Slava.[3] On fire and listing she drew too much water to
withdraw north through the dredged channel and was scuttled in an attempt to block the
channel.
Faced with further minefields the Germans decided not to push further and clear the
southern channel. By this stage, they had achieved their objective. On land, the
demoralised Russian defence crumpled with hardly a fight, most being evacuated. By the
20th all, the islands were occupied.
Overall, it had been a great strategic success. The loss of the islands put considerable
pressure on the Russians, opening up a large section of the coast to invasion. The losses
weren't over though, as the operation ended the battleship Markgraf was damaged by a mine
on its way back to port
The war winds down
After Operation Albion naval operations virtually ceased. The Russians still had their
defensive positions and the Germans had no reason to take much action in the Baltic.
Little happened until the Russian surrender in March 1918. After that, the only activity
was a pointless German exercise to occupy strategic points in the Gulf of Finland during
April 1918.
Conclusion
Overall, the Russians only had a marginal superiority. A passive, defensive role could
have allowed the Germans to dominate the area. Instead, the Russians engaged in an
aggressive campaign that caused the Germans considerable inconvenience. Such a policy went
against the conservative strategy of Stavka. It was the old case of one individual can
make all the difference. Essen was determined to take the war to the enemy and in doing
so; he dictated the course of naval events rather than being a passive player responding
to the German moves.
The Germans in contrast were so focused on the North Sea that they don't seem to have paid
much attention to the Baltic. They kept the High Seas Fleet in port, achieving little
while the Russians played in their backyard. Operation Albion demonstrated their potential
for major landings. Conducted in 1915 or 1916 it could have been a major blow for the
Russians.
[1] Boris Shalagin has undertaken the noble mission of writing a biography of Admiral
Nikolai Essen whose name is closely associated with the Baltic Fleet that will mark its
300th anniversary in 2003. Back in 1990 Shalagin started with an essay on the prominent
admiral. [1] (B.A. Shalagin, "Sobiratel Balflota," Morskoi sbornik, No. 12,
1990.) Six years later he completed a volume about Admiral Essen's life and military
service. [2] (B.A. Shalagin, Vziat more v svoi ruki, Nizhnii Novgorod, 1996.)
[2] Following the tragedy of the Pallada, Admiral Essen ordered that all ships be escorted
by destroyers. Furthermore, he ordered the shifting of operations to the southern area of
the Baltic, closer to the German sea lanes. Under Admirals Ludvig Kerber, Viktor Kanin,
Captain Alexander Kolchak and others, the detachments of cruisers and torpedo boats laid
1,500 mines in enemy waters. Germany's armoured cruiser Friedrich Karl, four
mine-sweepers, and fifteen steamships were subsequently destroyed and the cruisers
Augsburg and Gazelle seriously damaged. (http://www.neva.ru/EXPO96/book/chap11-2.html)
[3] The German dreadnoughts Nassau and Pozen managed to force the Slava aside and enter
the Gulf of Riga, where Admiral Schmidt lost the destroyer S-31. Russia's only loss was
the gunboat Sivuch, commanded by Captain Pyotr Cherkasov. The Sivuch had fought in the
darkness for nearly an hour in an unequal battle with the cruiser Augsburg, two destroyers
and the newly-arrived Nassau and Pozen. The heroic vessel fought to the last, then sank
under the ensign of St. Andrew. The year closed in the Baltic to the accompaniment of
exploding Russian mines, striking the enemy cruisers Bremen, Danzig, Lubek and the
destroyers V-191 and S-177. (http://www.neva.ru/EXPO96/book/chap11-2.html)
The Black Sea
Background
Ironically, the Black Sea tends to be dismissed as a backwater, whereas it was one of the
most active naval fronts of the war. It was one of the few areas where one naval power did
dominate the area and was able to exploit that control.
With the aura, surrounding the German battlecruiser Goeben there is often an assumption
that she dominated the Black Sea. It is quite remarkable to read some of the inaccurate
summaries of activities in the Black Sea by authors who should know better. The Goeben
certainly was important but the reality was that it was the Russians who had the upper
hand.
War begins
Turkish entry into the war is a complex topic and often misunderstood. Despite all the
myths and dramas the main factor was that they decided to back the ‘winners’,
particularly when they saw their traditional enemy Russia beaten in the opening battles.
It was actually the German led Turkish navy that opened hostilities, with a surprise
attack on the Russians on 29th October, nearly three months after the main war started.
A series of operations were launched against the Russian ports. There was minelaying at
key points, including the main Russian naval base at Sevastapol. Breslau, two old Turkish
cruisers and some destroyers attacked Russian shipping at various ports and shelled
harbour installations. The main attack came with a dawn bombardment by Goeben on the
harbour at Sevastapol. The intention was presumably to draw the Russian fleet out into the
minefields. Instead, she took three hits from Russian shore batteries and had to beat off
an aggressive attack from Russian torpedo boats. When the Russians did sail out later, in
the day, they used safe, alternative channels but the Goeben had already left.
As a surprise attack, it achieved little of real value. A few transports, a gunboat, and a
minelayer were sunk and there was damage to some shore installations. The biggest factor
was political, as it was the final act in Turkey’s entry into the war.
The Russian response
In the early stages Stavka were worried about Turkish landing around Odessa and raids on
shipping. This was fairly unrealistic but did mean there was pressure on the Russian
commander Admiral Ebergard to act in a defensive manner. This was shortsighted, as the
Russian predreadnoughts were only effective if concentrated. By themselves, 'defending'
different harbours, they would have been easy targets for Goeben. Stavka seemed unable to
understand this concept and continually complained about the failure to defend the coast.
Ebergard realised the better option was to put the pressure on the Turks and his aim was
to blockade the Bosphorus and cut Turkish sea communications.
The Russians did not have the resources for a permanent blockade of the Turkish coast. The
predreadnought's had a limited range, only being able to remain at sea for around four
days. Even in the Black Sea, it would take them a day to get to the Turkish coast which
meant only two days on blockade duty. What Ebergard wanted was to set up a blockade using
minefields at key points. There was plenty of scope to cut the seaborne communications but
at this stage, however the Russians only had a few light ships that had the speed to act
as raiders and evade the Goeben and Breslau.
To implement this policy Ebergard sailed on 4th November 1914 with the five
predreadnoughts and supporting ships to conduct operations off the Bosphorus. They laid
mines in the entrance but this first attempt was not successful. They then sailed along
the coast, carried out bombardment raids against Turkish facilities and sank three loaded
transports.
The Battle of Cape Sarych
Any hopes that the German Admiral Souchon had of an easy victory by the Goeben over the
grossly inferior predreadnoughts were quickly shattered in the first naval clash. On the
17th November, Ebergard was out again, shelling the port of Trebizond. Goeben sailed,
hoping to pick off isolated Russian ships as they were returning to the Crimea. Instead,
on the 18th, she encountered all five predreadnoughts off Cape Sarych. Visibility was poor
and when the Russian flagship Evstafi, leading the Russian line, finally spotted the
Goeben, they were only 8,000 yards apart. None of the following ships could spot the
target and finally Evstafi opened fire on her own. While some of the others opened fire in
due course, they were well off target.
It came down to a brief skirmish between the Goeben and the Evstafi. The Goeben was hit at
least once, probably from Evstafis first salvo. This hit knocked out a port secondary gun
and started an ammunition fire, which caused a magazine to be flooded. German accounts are
rather vague as to the exact damage or losses but it does appear to have been of concern.
After a brief action, Goeben altered course away and went to full speed. Again, German
accounts are somewhat evasive, they imply that she lost sight of the Russians and was
unable to find them again. It appears more likely that they were taken aback by the
accurate Russian fire and avoided further combat. Evstafi took four hits but was not
seriously damaged
Russia on the offensive
In December, the Russians launched operations against both the Bosphorus and Zonguldalk.
Extensive minelaying took place off the former and they attempted to block the harbour of
Zonguldalk with four old ships on 24th December. Things went wrong, one ship broke down,
and the others became separated. Breslau was out at sea and learning of the raid, she
intercepted the Russians. Two of the block ships were sunk and the others scuttled.
Goeben had led a lucky life so far but that was about to change. She was also out at sea
and returning to the Bosphorus on 26th December, she hit two of the new mines. Damage was
considerable and she spent three months undergoing repairs. A situation not helped by the
absence of a suitable dry dock. To overcome this, engineers were sent from Germany. They
built coffer dams around the damaged areas and then filled in the leaks with concrete.
These held until permanent repairs were done after the war.
In March 1915, a Russian squadron set off to raid the north Turkish coast. Several
merchant ships were sunk and various towns bombarded. This was quite a significant period
as for the first time the Russians had one of their new submarines available and this was
able to operate off the Bosphorus. More interestingly, it also saw two seaplane carriers
in action. While relatively ineffectual as attack aircraft, the seaplanes provided a
useful reconnaissance capacity. The Russians used seaplane carriers increasingly from then
on. Not bad for one of the most underrated navies of the war!
In retaliation, the Germans and Turks launched a major raid on Russian shipping in April.
It backfired as the old cruiser Medjidieh hit a mine off Odessa and was sunk. The Russians
actually managed to salvage her and put her back into service in October as the Prut.
Goeben raided the Crimean coast but achieved little and had to retreat before the combined
Russian predreadnoughts.
At this stage, the British and French launched their operation against Gallipoli. Stavka
felt there was little they could do to support this due to Russia’s limited naval
capacity. In addition, they were not prepared to find any troops to carry out a
simultaneous landing near the Bosphorus. Even so, throughout April and May 1915 the
Russians raided the area around the Bosphorus in support of the Allied landings at
Gallipoli.
Goeben came out again on 9th May to try to pick off isolated ships and nearly did so, on
the 10th when attempting to catch two predreadnoughts, two seaplane carriers and some
light ships engaged in bombardment operations. Fortunately, she was spotted by a screening
cruiser and the Russians started to concentrate on their other two predreadnoughts. For a
period, the latter faced the Goeben by themselves, giving the Goeben the upper hand.
German gunnery however did not live up to its reputation; amazingly, she failed to score a
single hit on the Russian ships, despite ideal conditions. With considerable skill,
Ebergard managed to combine his four predreadnoughts. Goeben took two hits, possibly four,
before fleeing.
Russia’s motley collection of predreadnought’s had already shown themselves
prepared to face up Goeben and now were to be reinforced. In October the first of the
eagerly awaited modern battleships came into service, followed three months later by the
second. Each was a match for the Goeben, well armored and with heavier firepower. The
latter's only advantage was her superior speed, which gave her the opportunity to avoid
combat. The Russians were able to form a battle group around each of these ships and a
third based on the predreadnoughts.
The shipping war
Sea transport in the Black Sea was important for the Turks due to the lack of road or rail
links along the coast. Normal commercial shipping was extensive and sea transport was
essential for moving troops and supplies to the Caucasus front. In particular, the port of
Zonguldalk on the Black Sea coast supplied most of the coal for Constantinople. There was
no major alternative, as at this stage, the survival of Serbia made it difficult to rail
large amounts of material from Germany or Austria.
The Russians devoted much effort to raiding shipping along these routes. Such raids had a
considerable impact on Turkey’s ability to wage war. There was little they could do
about this as the Turkish navy was quite unsuited for escort duties. The only viable
escorts were Goeben and Breslau. This created a difficult dilemma for the Germans as with
such limited resources they could not afford to take risks. An illustration of this is the
situation in July 1915. Breslau had hit a mine while going out to escort a convoy and was
out of action for months. This left only Goeben, an old Turkish cruiser Hamidieh, and some
torpedo boats to act as escorts.
To carry out the raids the Russians had started with four large, fast destroyers and now
more were starting to enter service. These were able to raid along the coast with relative
ease. Steadily the Turkish merchant fleet was worn away and the loss of coal in particular
was a major blow to the Turkish economy. In a vicious circle, the Goeben had to restrict
its operations due to coal shortages.
Convoy raiding was not entirely one sided. While Goeben and Breslau may have been under
major handicaps occasionally, they were sent out on shipping raids or bombardments of
Russian ports. Such operations however tended to be inconsequential affairs that achieved
little except act as a moral boost.
Some relief came with the arrival in June 1915 of a few German U boats. Their presence had
a significant effect on Russian operations. There were some transport losses which caused
great concern. More significantly, it compelled the Russians to exercise excessive caution
and cut back on operations by the predreadnoughts. It was the poor response to the U boats
that contributed to Ebergards dismissal in July 1916. This was no help for the Turks as
his replacement was the highly competent and even more aggressive Admiral Kolchak.
Kolchak launched a major minelaying campaign, which severely restricted the U boats access
to the Black Seas. In time, they were lost through mines and accidents and the Russians
activities were able to proceed unhindered. Generally, the U boats had bad luck and the
Russian shipping losses were relatively minor compared to those the British suffered but
as always, the psychological impact was far greater.
Again things were not entirely one sided as the Russian submarines were having a similar
effect. Goeben narrowly avoided being torpedoed in November 1915. That incident made
Souchon even more reluctant to risk her unless it was vital. An attitude which caused some
tension between him and the Turkish leadership.
Russian convoy raids continued and were supplemented by a bombing raid on Zonguldalk. This
was launched from a force of seaplane carriers on 6th Feb 1916 and managed to sink a large
collier. The coal crisis and the effect on moral became so critical that Goeben spent more
and more time devoted to acting as a convoy escort. On 8th January 1916, she set off after
two destroyers which had sunk a collier. It must have been something of a shock to run
into one of the new Russian dreadnoughts, the Imperatritsa Ekaterina (see above). For such
a new ship, her gunnery was surprisingly good and she achieved a straddle at a range of
20,000 yards. Unable to challenge the far more powerful Russian ship, the Goeben fled
undamaged.
By now, the Russians were actually running out of targets, having sunk most of the
available ships. The Turks were compelled to start using small sailing craft. A network of
spotting stations enabled these craft to head for sheltered harbours if Russian ships were
spotted. While this helped, the raiders still sank large numbers. In many cases, the boats
were run into shallow water at the first sign of trouble and sunk by their captains. Later
they could be recovered.
The Turks also resorted to the few fast ships that could make the run between ports
overnight. Eventually they were partially saved by the fall of Serbia, which enabled coal
to be shipped in from Germany. From March 1916, Germany was forced to send a train load of
coal every day to Constantinople but even this was inadequate.
Russian dominance
In the first half of 1916, the major focus for the Russian navy was supporting army
operations on the Caucasus front. The Russians now had sufficient forces that they could
deploy a sizeable force just to support land operations. While they had no major port in
the area, they were able to build up Batum as a base for small ships.
In January 1916, the Rostislav and some light ships bombarded Turkish positions and
eventually forced them to pull back several times. In a combined operation, they were
covered by one of the battle groups and there were also destroyer raids between Trebizond
and Batum.
For all the talk about the potential of amphibious operations during the war, it is ironic
that the Russian achievements get so little attention. The Russians had a type of small
coastal merchant vessel operating in the shallow waters of the Sea of Azoz which were
readily adaptable to become an excellent landing ship. To complement these they also built
a number of landing barges.
Using these new resources, they were able to use these to land a force of 2,100 men behind
the Turkish lines in March 1916. Again, Rostislav and light ships provided gunfire
support. The operation forced the Turks to pull back. Following up the Russians conducted
another landing further down the coast and seized the small port of Rize. This was a well
organised operation involving 22 transports. There was proper beach control, clearly
marked channels swept for mines, aerial reconnaissance from the seaplane carriers, anti
submarine patrols and anti submarine nets. Offshore there were screening forces, including
two battle groups. Later 8,200 of these troops re-embarked and were shipped further down
the coast.
It should be stressed that neither of these operations encountered much opposition,
nevertheless they were well conducted and a fine example of the Russians ability to
exploit naval superiority and mobility.
It is a measure of the desperate situation of the Turks, that the Goeben and Breslau were
now pressed into service to act as fast transports to ship reinforcements to Trebizond.
Later they did try some raids against Russian shipping but always had to be on their guard
against the superior forces screening them. On one cruise in April 1916, Breslau delivered
troops and munitions to Trebizond. She then set off on a raid, carrying out a bombardment
and sinking two small transports. Then she ran into the Imperatritsa Ekaterina and her
escorts. At a range of 18,000 yards, the battleship opened fire, achieving a straddle on
her third salvo. Zig zagging at high speed Breslau managed to get out of range with only
minor splinter damage.
During April, the Russians were able to use Rize to ship in major reinforcements from
Novorossisk. The pressure was sufficient to force the Turks to abandon Trebizond. Russian
troops seized the town and in May two, divisions were shipped there in a well managed
operation.
Things start to go wrong
After mid 1916 a series of outside events influenced actions in the Black Sea. As a
result, the Russians were not able to exploit the very substantial opportunities that
their dominance had opened up. The first event was the entry of Rumania into the war on
the Allies side in August 1916. Russian naval units were diverted to supporting them by
raiding the Bulgarian coast and providing gunfire support to Rumanian land forces.
They suffered a major setback in October 1916 with the loss Imperatritsa Maria. She was
moored in Sevastopol when an explosion in the forward magazine wrecked her and she was
scuttled at her mooring to prevent further explosions. There were the inevitable claims of
sabotage but it was probably an accident. Although a bitter blow it did not seriously
change the Russian dominance, merely reduced their capability. Another ship was being
built and they made great efforts to ensure the safe arrival of all the turbines which had
been shipped from Britain to Archangel, across Russia to the Sea of Azov and then across
the Black Sea to the ship yard at Nikolaiev. Despite this, the third new battleship was
only completed in 1917 after the Russian collapse.
The Russians were gearing up for a series of major amphibious operations in 1917. The
strategic situation was not good however and the plans had to be scrapped, as the troops
were needed elsewhere. The first Russian revolution in March 1917 bought little change
initially and the fleet continued to operate, albeit at a lower level.
Operations against the Turkish coast continued. Mine laying and raiding continued to take
a heavy toll on their shipping and coal shortages became a major problem again. In an
attempt to relieve the problem, more German submarines arrived. These proved of little
value, with two being lost to mines and the other two simply vanishing. For this, they
only managed to sink four Russian transports.
In April 1917, the Russians carried out mine laying and a series of bombing attacks around
Sinope in Rumania. The latter were launched from an expanded fleet of seaplane carriers.
These should not be rated too highly, they were too weak to do much damage, and more harm
was done through escorting destroyers conducting shore bombardment. Even so, they
demonstrated the willingness of the navy to adopt new techniques.
The last clash between German and Russian forces came June 1917. The Breslau was sent to
lay mines off the Danube. She was intercepted by Svobodnaya Rossiya but managed to flee to
safety. Breslau had a narrow escape as even at that stage, the Russians were still
aggressive and their gunnery was good.
The war winds down
After June, however the morale and discipline started to collapse. It is a measure of the
leadership of Ebergard and Kolchak that the sailors were among the last to give way to the
revolution and the fleet stayed semi active while most other areas were falling apart. As
a result, the Russian fleet continued to dominate the Black Sea. They still conducted some
minor operations up until November. Goeben and Breslau could still only venture out for
the occasional raid. To an extent, they were limited by the lack of decent coal.
The tragedy was that the final Russian collapse came just in time to save the Turks. The
economy was crumbling under the pressure of the blockade and a series of defeats on land.
From late 1917, the Germans steadily occupied Russia and by May 1918, they had entered
Sevastopol. The best of the Russian ships fled to other ports and the Germans were left
with some of the older ships including two worn out predreadnoughts. The situation was
fluid with changing and differing attitudes from all parties.
Eventually in June 1918 after great pressure from the Germans, some of the newer Russian
ships, including the Volya, were sailed back to Sevastopol. The rest were scuttled,
including the Svobodnaya Rossiya and most of their modern destroyers. The Germans never
had the chance to use the captured ships; apart from anything else, they didn't have the
crews to man them. It was the end of naval activity and little happened for the rest of
the war.
Conclusion
Given the constraints on them, particularly the negative, defensive approach of Stavka, it
would have been easy to adopt a defensive posture. This could have allowed Goeben to
dominate the area. The Germans had a brilliant leader in Souchon but he simply lacked the
resources to do much. Fortunately, for the Russians they had leaders who were his match.
The key, as so often, was determined, aggressive leadership. Ebergard and Kolchak were
prepared to seize the initiative but not be reckless.
Overall, the Russian navy performed well in one of the most active naval fronts of the
war. The destroyers conducted a relentless and devastating campaign of raiding. Their
achievements were limited more by the lack of targets than resources. This was backed up
by an aggressive mine laying program. It was the Turkish shipping that was crippled and
the Goeben that was forced to respond to the Russian initiative.
Bibliography
A Naval History of World War I, P G Halpern, University College London, London, 1994.
Originally published by United States Naval Institute
North of Gallipoli, G Nekrasov, East European Monographs, distributed by Columbia
University Press, New York, 1992
Decline & Fall of the Ottoman Empire, A. Palmer
John Murray (Publishers) Ltd, London, 1993
History of the First World War, various authors
BPC Publishing Ltd, London for Purnell, 1966?
All the Worlds Fighting Ships, R Gardiner, Volumes 1860-1905 and 1905-1922, Conway
Maritime Press
Action off Cape Sarych, Steve McLaughlin
Biographies of Russian Naval Leaders, Steve McLaughlin
Unpublished articles
The Ship that Changed the World, D van der Vat
Baltic Assignment, Michael Wilson
END
Back to Despatch Page 2
Return to Despatch Page 1
E-Mail
Copyright@Thoran Braune 1996
|
A DESCRIPTION OF EARLY ITALIAN WARRIOR IMAGE ON A
CAMPANIAN BELL-KRATER
by Thoran Braune
The Campanian Bell-Krater (46.01, Nicholson Museum, University of Sydney) is in red figure
on black style. Interior and exterior painted black over red wash.
Measurements
Height - 42.2cm.
Height of Base - 4cm.
Base Stem width - 8cm.
Diameter with Rim - 41.5cm.
Diameter of Rim - 15.5cm
Diameter of Bowl - 26cm, tapering to 8cm.
Diameter of Base - 16.9cm.
Left Handle across - 12cm.
Left Handle Height - 8cm.
Left Handle out from krater wall - 4.7cm.
Right Handle across - 11.5cm.
Right Handle Height - 8cm.
Right Handle out from krater Wall - 5cm
Obverse Panel - Viewed from left to right.
Two women and a warrior, the middle woman has only face towards the warrior, this may mean
she did not expect him.
Woman standing (18cm) facing seated woman and warrior, holding plate/bowel in left hand,
grapes in right hand. Bracelets (painted white) on both arms. Hair tied back and up and
covered with white cloth. Necklace (painted white dots). The feet are white (could be to
represent shoes as the flesh is not white).
Next in the middle is the seated woman (16cm). She sits on four stacked rocks (painted
yellow and white). Bracelets (painted white) on her arms. Left hand palm down on rocks.
Right hand held up holding a leaf object. Feet painted white. Head turned towards the
warrior behind her. Hair tied and covered similar to first woman.
The warrior (18.5cm) standing. Right hand holding spear (painted white). Left arm hidden
by circular hoplite type shield. Wearing Attic style helmet with crest (all painted
white), the crest of the helmet penetrates the top border. Wearing a bronze belt (painted
white) Bronze greaves (painted white) on legs. He is facing both women.
Reverse Panel - Left to right.
Two draped youths facing each other.
First youth is draped with a diadem (painted white) and has arms hidden in drapery.
There is a square in the centre with white painted border and a dark painted long teardrop
in the centre (the square could represent a window).
Below the ‘window’ is a circle, which is framed, in white paint except where the
circle is broken by a dark painted cross dividing the circle into quarters. Each quarter
of the circle has a dark dot, the upper right hand quarters’ dot is partly within the
horizontal arm of the cross; the lower right quarters’ dot is larger than the rest.
The second youth is facing the first youth and is dressed the same with his arms hidden in
drapery.
Borders - Lower border is a wave pattern.
The upper border runs under the rim and is some form of leaf pattern broken on the sides
by the handles.
Sides - The sides have palmettes under the handles.
Damage - Small areas of ware around the outer part of the rim. One chip on the rim over
the left handle.
Evidence of red wash on the bottom of the interior of the bowl. At the handles and under
the base is the clay colour.
On Campanian vases[1] Samnite men are usually depicted as warriors in their distinctive
clothing and equipment[2]. Our main source for Samnite warrior equipment is Campainian
vase painting[3]. Samnite warrior activities are divided into two groups in vase painting.
The first group is the combat-related activities[4] and combat scenes[5]. The second group
is the ritual activities. It is more common to show in ritual scenes a male and a female
than just the male warrior[6]. The Nicholson bell-krater falls within the ritual group
with a group scene.
By the 4th century BCE, there seems to be three main Campanian pottery workshops. One in
Cumae and two in Capua[7]. The CA Painter[8] was in Cumae while the Libation Group worked
in Capua[9].
A large source of tomb-paintings is at Paestum in Lucania and a small number in Campania
near Capua. Fourteen tomb-paintings from Capua show warriors[10].
On Campanian vases the Samnite warrior is shown wearing their particular tunic, belt, and
other military equipment[11]. Belts can be plain or decorated. Sometimes clasps are shown
on belts[12]. The other non-bronze belts could be of leather; we see such a belt on
Amazons[13].
The Nicholson Italian Campanian Bell-Krater is a very fine example of its type and well
worth a look if you are in the area on a weekday. It is this type of imagery on vases and
tomb wall paintings, that artists for books such as Osprey ‘Early Roman Armies’
use to give wargamers and figure painters an idea of what to do, in terms of painting our
little men.
END
[1] Like the Nicholson Museum bell krater.
[2] This is not the case on Apulian vases were the men are shown in a greater varity of
clothing and situations.
[3] The Capuan tomb-paintings were almost completely destroyed during World War Two.
Schneider-Hermann, G., The Samnites of the Fourth Century BC as depicted on Campainian
Vases and in other sources, Institute of Classical Studies, London, 1996, Chapter 1, p.3.
[4] Training, maintenance etc
[5] A calyx krater from Chicago, a Skyphos in Naples and an Amphora in Melbourne all show
single combat-related images. Schneider-Hermann, G., Part One, Chapter 3, pp.78-79.
[6] Schneider-Hermann, G., Part One, Chapter 3, p.113.
[7] Hannah, Patricia and Robert, Athens-Sicily-Campania: Warriors and Painters, Greek
Colonists and Native Populations, edit by Jean-Paul Desceudres, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1990, p.278.
[8] Which the Nicholson Bell-krater is from.
[9] The Libation Group is notable for its warrior scenes of mixed Greek and Samnite dress.
[10] Hannah, Patricia and Robert, Athens-Sicily-Campania: Warriors and Painters, Greek
Colonists and Native Populations, edit by Jean-Paul Desceudres, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1990, p.279.
[11] Schneider-Hermann, G., The Samnites of the Fourth Century BC as depicted on
Campainian Vases and in other sources, Institute of Classical Studies, London, 1996,
p.XXXI.
[12] This could be to help indicate it is a bronze belt.
[13] Belts are shown in a variety of scenes on Apulian vases, not just martial scenes.
There is little difference in how belts are shown on men, women or children except that
the bronze belt with clasps are only on males.
|