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Extracts
from these books relating to the Viscount Disasters
Ken Flower
Page
210
On 3 September an incident occurred which put an immediate end to the
Nkomo/Smith
negotiations. This 'stroke of fate', as Smith described it, forced all the players in the
Rhodesian game on to a different course.
An Air Rhodesia Viscount was shot down by Nkomo's ZIPRA guerrillas, using a Russian SAM-7
ground-to-air missile, shortly after take-off from Kariba to Salisbury. Eighteen out of
the fifty-three people on board survived the crash; ten survivors, while still dazed and
shocked, were massacred by Z 1 P RA guerrillas before rescuers could reach the scene of
the crash. Nkomo compounded the crime when, in a BBC interview, he appeared to boast about
the attack. Only twenty-four hours earlier white Rhodesians had welcomed the official
release of news of the
Nkomo/Smith negotiations. Now they demanded an end to negotiations and military
retaliation on Z I P RA forces in Zambia. Any illusions they might have retained that they
were fighting a war, not terrorism, were shattered, and as they waited in vain for
condemnation of ZIPRA'S action from Britain, the United States or anywhere else, they
began to realise they were completely alone in their grief and anger.
I well remember Smith's double-edged reaction to the 'stroke of fate': firstly,
great relief and a sudden release of tension for, ironically, settlement with Nkomo had by
3 September been there for the taking and Smith might have had to grasp it, to his own
embarrassment and the condemnation of many of his party; and secondly, righteous
shock and horror.
Page219
Within a week of my return to Salisbury from Morocco another Viscount airliner was shot
down on take-off from Kariba, killing all on board. Among the dead were my son-in-law's
parents and members of five families within sight of my home. On this occasion Nkomo
claimed that his troops had planned to shoot down Walls, who was in Kariba at the time. It
was a palpable lie..."
Peter Godwin & Ian Hancock
Page
288
Two days after Smith's speech, and eleven minutes after taking off from Kariba, bound for
Salisbury with fifty-two passengers and four crew members on board, Captain John Hood of
Air Rhodesia's flight RH825 radioed a distress signal. His Viscount then disappeared near
the Urungwe TTL. Wreckage was spotted from the air the next morning, and a ground search
arrived soon after. Thirty-eight bodies were found in and around the aircraft, obviously
victims of the crash. Another ten were heaped together a short distance away, all of them
shot dead. Three survivors were found near the scene, and another five-who had walked off
looking for help-were located later. A macabre story soon emerged. A heat-seeking SAM-7
missile had hit the inner starboard engine. Captain Hood almost executed a safe crash
landing in a cotton field except for the last moment when the Viscount hit a ditch and
broke up. The tail section broke away and eighteen lives were saved. Half an hour after
the crash, and after the five had gone for help, a group of 'terrorists' appeared on the
crash scene and ordered the remaining survivors to assemble whereupon they opened fire
with their AK-47s. Three started running and got away, and watched as the 'terrorists'
looted the aircraft before finally leaving.
For days on end, White Rhodesia was overwhelmed by shock, grief, and anger, a reaction
strengthened by the further news that Umtali's residential suburbs were rocketed on the
night of 8 September. The demand for instant retaliation extended through the Security
Forces, stopping only when it reached Walls. The anger increased with the news that Nkomo
had claimed credit for downing the plane-while denying that ZIPRA had killed any
survivors-and had accused Air Rhodesia of ferrying troops and military equipment. A false
report that he had laughed (or 'cackled') merely strengthened demands for revenge. So did
the stories of individual and family tragedies circulated in the media, spelt out in the
condolence columns, and passed around by word of mouth. Although the names were not
released it was reported that two of the ten murdered survivors were children and that
another six were women. Eight of the ten, therefore, were the traditional 'innocents'.
Cheryl Tilley, the sister of the schoolboy killed by 'terrorists' in January, did not
survive the incident, nor did her fiancé. Captain Hood and his co-pilot died on impact
and became instant heroes because of their skilful and valiant attempts to save the
aircraft. Hood's own story saddened its readers. A Bulawayo boy, with 8,000 flying hours,
he had two young daughters by a previous marriage. A happy photograph recorded his
remarriage just three months prior to the crash. One prominent Asian family was especially
devastated; eight of its members were killed. There were also the customary tales of
distraught relatives waiting for news, of people who joined the flight unexpectedly, and
of others who had a miraculous change of plans. By coincidence, there was a routine
meeting of NATJOC set down for 4th September where Ian Smith was expected to press for
tougher military action against the 'terrorists'. Ken Flower observed that Walls kept the
session within bounds but also noted that the sense of outrage 'took some time to
develop'. Outrage was certainly evident by 6 September when parliament met to debate the
estimates. By then the execution of the ten survivors was uppermost in members' minds.The
killers became 'vermin', 'sub-humans', 'Neanderthal', 'animals'. Their presumed
backers-most notably Owen, Carter, and Andrew Young-were, in the words of the Afrikaner
farmer who represented Karoi, 'dripping with blood--blood from the innocent and helpless'.
The RFs Chief Whip assured the government that feeling was 'running high about this
matter' as members canvassed the potential responses: more raids into Zambia, the
imposition of martial law, a general mobilization. Wing Commander Gaunt wanted a
nation-wide curfew and the shooting of any curfew-breakers as 'terrorists'. Ministers
hastily assured their back-bench that there would be some form of retaliation. Irvine
warned that Rhodesians 'will not let these innocents go unavenged' and promised the
Patriotic Front 'that those who seek to ride the wind, will reap the whirlwind'. Ian Smith
promised something more definite: on 9, September he told parliament that Rhodesian
patience had been tested too far and it was now time to embark upon 'a positive and firm
course'.
Calmer voices could not compete with the wrath of a society. Bishop Paul Burrough appealed
to Rhodesians not to seek revenge and to remember that 'the most grievous suffering is
still among the defence-less people in the tribal trust lands'. A spokesman for the
mourning Asian family pleaded for peace and said he feared retaliation. But the words
urging caution, brotherly love, and reconciliation were ignored in the memorial services
held around Rhodesia on the following Friday. The spirit of the Old Testament prevailed
over the New. John da Costa, Dean of the Anglican All Saints Cathedral in Salisbury,
observed that the 2,500 mourners who crammed into the cathedral, or listened outside,
ignored one part of his sermon. Looking directly at Smith and other senior figures in the
front pew, the Dean spoke of the blameworthiness of politicians who made opportunistic
speeches, and of men who called themselves Christians who treated other human beings as
expendable and did not show enough real love and understanding. He also wondered how
clergymen (such as Muzorewa and Sithole), who were supposed to be great reconcilers, could
involve themselves in divisive politics. These comments were soon forgotten. What mattered
was the Dean's tirade against those whose bestiality 'stinks in the nostrils of Heaven'
and those leaders whose 'silence' in condemning the atrocities was 'deafening'. Outside
the cathedral two men held placards one of which told Smith what to say to Nkomo at their
next meeting: 'GO TO HELL YOU MURDERING BASTARD'. The Dean and Bishop Burrough wanted the
demonstrators to leave. Some of the crowd agreed. It was not the time or the place for
political spectacle. Yet the RF back-bench, most of the electorate, the hot bloods in the
Security Forces, and the demonstrators out-side All Saints Cathedral all wanted that
message delivered to the Patriotic Front.
Smith announced the NATJOC decisions on ll September. He made his now-familiar
denunciation of the British and American governments whom he blamed for the escalation of
'terrorism' and for the Elim and Viscount 'massacres', and he accused Julius Nyerere of
being the 'evil genius' behind Nkomo. The Prime Minister admitted that his contacts with
Kaunda and Nkomo had become unpopular but insisted that these negotiations had been in the
best interests of the country and would resume if necessary. The 'stroke of fate'-as Smith
called the Viscount incident-may have horrified him; it also saved him from having to sell
Nkomo to a suspicious electorate. Forced back upon his colleagues in the Transitional
government, Smith made the best of the situation by calling upon the Rhodesians to
exercise their virtues of ingenuity, energy, resourcefulness, and 'well-known and
well-acclaimed valour'. They should accept his measures and eschew the desperate
alternatives of capitulation or making a do-or-die stand. He knew that his earlier remarks
in parliament had fuelled some unrealistic expectations. The Herald, which had previously
urged caution, described Smith's speech as a 'damp squib', and claimed that the
overwhelming public response was one of bitter disappointment. A minority opinion was that
he could do little else. Relieved that Smith had not launched a programme of vengeance,
NUF accused him of incompetent leadership and called for his resignation and the formation
of a national government. The RAP was predictably contemptuous, and called for a 'ruthless
prosecution of the war'. Ever hopeful, the party expected a surge in support following
Smith's apparent failure to read the mood of the electorate. Once again, it was
disappointed. In no time, the electorate resumed its customary position of accepting that
'Smithy' was doing his best. Page 243
On 12 February 1979 another civilian Viscount was brought down by a heat-seeking missile
just after taking off from Kariba. All fifty-nine people on board were killed outright.
Sixteen days later on 28 February-Ian Smith addressed parliament for the last time as
Prime Minister.
Ian Smith
Page
266
With a traumatic week just over, with a number of innocent civilians being murdered by
terrorists, all of them black people -- their only crime that they were not prepared to
co-operate in terrorism - came the news of the tragic disaster of the
shooting down of one of our civilian Viscount aircraft on its flight from Victoria Falls
via Kariba to Salisbury on late Sunday afternoon, 3 September. The terrorists had managed
to procure a number of heat-seeking missiles from those sources all over the
world that are looking for financial gain, even at the cost of human life and tragedy. The
bringing down of the aircraft and, still worse, the cold-blooded murder by the terrorists
of ten of the survivors, including women and children, caused a degree of anger among
Rhodesians difficult to control. During the days that followed, resentment and the
accompanying desire to exact retribution mounted and I received more than one
representation seeking permission to enter the area of the tragedy and make the local
people pay for their crime of harbouring and assisting the terrorists. I, too, would have
derived great satisfaction in getting to grips with the gangsters associated with the
crime, but sadly, this is easier said than done. We would continue to hunt down and
destroy terrorism wherever it was found, but we knew on the evidence before us that many,
if not the majority, of the tribal people were not voluntarily on the side of the
terrorists, but had had pistols pointed at their heads. There was a strong feeling for me
to broadcast to the nation, and on Sunday 10 September I announced that the government
would introduce 'a modification of martial law which will enable us to streamline
procedures in order to facilitate the prosecution of our war effort while at the same time
leaving intact those civil authorities which are required to play their part'. The new
measures, I said, were to be applied in particular areas as and when required, and not on
a nation-wide basis many, if not the majority, of the tribal people were not voluntarily
on the side of the terrorists, but had had pistols pointed at their heads. So it was
necessary, although difficult, to counsel cool heads and remind people that two wrongs do
not make a right:the sins of the gangsters should not be visited upon their
fellow-tribesmen.
"The Story of My Life" Joshua Nkomo
Died July 1999 
Page
165 But
our success against the Rhodesian Air Force was far greater than they allowed to be known
at the time. We could not claim the credit that we deserved, because we needed to keep
secret the fact that we had been given some Soviet surface-to-air missiles, Sam-7s. We
deployed them first in defence of our camps in Zambia, and caught the enemy by surprise.
The first time we used them we knocked down two of their strike aircraft, the second time
we got four. In all we shot down almost thirty of their planes and helicopters: the
Rhodesian minister of defence was forced to resign, and they replaced the losses only by
importing second-hand Hawker Hunters from Israel, with South African help. One of the
Smith government’s great propaganda successes was in covering up the extent of the
damage we had done them. The only times they would admit to losses of aircraft were when
we brought down passenger planes, which we did on two occasions.
These tragic incidents need
explaining. The Rhodesians used their civil airliners equally for carrying passengers and
for carrying troops. The first time we shot one down was immediately after Smith’s
troops had carried out a particularly brutal attack on the camps at
Chimoio, in
Mozambique, where well over a thousand of our young people died. Rhodesian television had
shown pictures of Viscount aircraft in Air Rhodesia markings ferrying in their
paratroopers for the attack. And a plane carrying armed soldiers is surely a legitimate
target in a war.
Of course it was not our
policy to shoot down civil airliners: if we had wanted to we could have done so often, but
we carefully refrained from that. What happened was that we identified one of the same
aircraft that had been shown on television loaded with troops. It landed at Victoria
Falls, where we knew paratroops were stationed, and as it took off we shot it down with a
Sam missile. (Error: the aircraft took off from Kariba. Webmaster) Forty-eight
people, most of them holidaymakers, died in the crash; eight survived. Ten of those who
died were said to have been shot on the ground after escaping from the wreck.
It was a tragic mistake. I
felt it personally. One man was killed with his mother and father and his wife and
children - the whole family wiped out. Their name was Gulab, Zimbabweans of Indian origin.
Mr Gulab was a good friend of mine, who often fixed me up with airline tickets in ways
that avoided alerting the police. I regret his loss very much.The Rhodesian propaganda
people at once claimed that our anti-aircraft team had killed ten survivors on the ground.
This was obviously untrue, since the plane fell well away from the firing-point. Some of
our Zipra boys did approach the crash site, and did help the eight survivors to get to
safety, bringing them water and looking after them. I truly have no idea how the ten died.
I do not believe they were killed by our people: I hope not.
I then made an error of a
different kind. The following day the BBC telephoned me for a comment on the
shooting-down. I told them as much of the truth as I knew. Then, fairly enough in the
circumstances, they asked me what weapon the plane had been brought down with. Clearly I
could not say it was a Sam-7: it was a secret that we had such things. To turn the
question aside, 1 answered that we had brought it down by throwing stones, and as I said
so I laughed a bit. I was not laughing at the deaths of all those civilians, but at the
evasive answer. The laugh was remembered, rather than my regret at those unnecessary
deaths. In retaliation for the first Viscount disaster, the Rhodesians mounted a savage
raid on our Freedom Camp, just north of Lusaka. It was not a military training camp, but a
genuine refugee camp for young boys. Most of the 351 who died were, just youngsters.
Later we again brought down
one of Air Rhodesia’s Viscounts, with serious loss of life. This time too civilians
died because the Rhodesians used the same aircraft for civilian and for military purposes.
Our intelligence people in Salisbury had identified the Rhodesian army commander, General
Walls, getting into a Viscount plane. The same aircraft was landing at
Wankie, at Victoria
Falls and at Kariba: General Walls was reported to be still on board. After takeoff from
Kariba, the plane passed our Sam emplacement on the hill: the missile team identified the
plane by its number fired and brought it down. Shortly afterwards another Viscount took
off and flew past our missile crew, who did not fire because spies had not identified it
as carrying a military target. (The aircraft took a completly different track as the
crew were aware of the crash, Web-designer)
Walls had changed planes, and
was aboard the second. Walls and his staff officers were clearly a legitimate target. A
few years later, when I was a minister and he was commanding our post-independence army, I
asked him why he had swopped planes. He just laughed. We talked about when his troops
raided my home in Lusaka and killed four people in the house, while I eluded them. We had
tried to kill the other, and in both attempts innocent people had been killed by mistake.
It was that kind of war.
I still wonder whether Walls
had switched aircraft because they had intercepted our radio talk and knew it was a likely
target. We, of course, could not say publicly that Walls was our target; we could not
admit either that we had a sophisticated radio link, or that we had spies in all the civil
airports of Rhodesia.
One other attempt to shoot
down a civil airliner was unsuccessful. The target was P.W. Botha, the South African
defence minister, who was flying in to Victoria Falls. That very day some South African
soldiers who were operating in the area were killed by our men on Rhodesian territory.
Botha was a legitimate target
- but the missile malfunctioned, and missed his aircraft. He left in a hurry, without
performing his task of inaugurating a swimming-pool for the troops.
The worst thing about the war
was the callousness it bred. It is true, and I regret it, that atrocities were committed
by people on our side, by Zipra fighters as well as by Zania men. Some of those killed
were isolated white farmers and their families who happened to be in the way. Some were
African chiefs who may have collaborated with the Smith regime, but who had little
alternative if their own families and their people were to survive. It was not our policy
to kill such people. But armed men, alone or in small groups, may come to disregard the
importance of human life. It was necessary to fight a guerrilla war, and in such a war
terrible things are bound to happen.
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