Research areas
Miscellany
- Philosophers with Erdos numbers, here (last updated June 2009).
The papers provided here are either works in progress or
final drafts before publication. For citation purposes,
please seek permission or refer to published version.
If no link provided to online version, the paper may still
be available on request.
-
Everettian Quantum Mechanics and the Nature of
Chance. Draft.
This paper examines David Deutsch's attempt to
derive the probabilistic elements of quantum
mechanics merely from a non-probabilistic
many-worlds interpretation and some decision
theoretic assumptions.
-
Chance: The Best Bet. Draft.
The sorts of probabilities that appear in
fundamental physical theories appear to be
fundamental and objective. This paper advocates
analysing those chances in overtly epistemic
terms as roughly, "the best bet", given
available evidence.
-
Dispositions,
Manifestations, and Causal Structure. In
The Metaphysics of Powers, ed. A. Marmodoro.
(London: Routledge, forthcoming)
Dispositions are typically individuated by their
stimulus and response conditions. But perhaps there
is more to the identity of dispositions than this.
In this paper, I explore the idea that some
dispositions might be individuated by the causal
process by which their manifestation comes about.
To be a manifestation of fragility, a causal
process might require a certain sort of
'structure'. Most of the paper is devoted to trying
to identify what that sort of structure might be
like. This is motivated by my earlier paper,
'Humean Dispositionalism' where I attempted to
explain some of the modal features of powers in
terms of the idea that powers are essentially
associated with certain natural kinds of
manifestations.
- The Metaphysics of
Dispositions and Causes. In Dispositions and
Causes, ed. T. Handfield. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2009). [Link to OUP page]
This article gives a general overview of recent
metaphysical work on dispositional properties and causal
relations. It serves as an introduction to the anthology,
Dispositions and Causes, which includes
contributions from Stephen Barker, Alexander Bird, Nancy
Cartwright, Richard Corry, Antony Eagle, Marc Lange,
Jennifer McKitrick, Tim O'Connor, and Ann Whittle.
- Humean Dispositionalism. Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 113–26.
In this paper I present a novel theory of causal
powers that vindicates the dispositionalist claim that
causal powers are basic, without embracing brute necessary
connections. The key assumptions of the theory are that
there are natural types of causal processes, and that
manifestations of powers are identified with certain kinds
of causal processes.
- Dispositions,
Rules, and Finks
. (Co-authored with Alexander Bird.)
Philosophical Studies 140 (2008): 285–98.
This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to
the Kripke–Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent
attempts to employ dispositional approaches to this puzzle have
appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes – interfering
dispositions and conditions – to explain why the
rule-following disposition is not always manifested. We argue that
this approach fails.
- Unfinkable dispositions
. Synthese
160 (2008): 297–308.
This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional
properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears
the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical
properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks and
antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not
susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by
intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility
that some dispositions – those which lack any causal basis
– may be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks
and antidotes are a major obstacle to a conditional analysis of
dispositions, these dispositions that are unfinkable may be
successfully analysed by the conditional analysis of dispositions.
- The metaphysics of causal models: Where's the
biff? (Co-authored with Charles Twardy, Kevin Korb,
and Graham Oppy.) Erkenntnis
68 (2008): 149–68.
This paper presents an attempt to integrate
theories of causal processes – of the kind developed
by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe – into a theory of
causal models using Bayesian networks.
- Armstrong and the modal inversion of dispositions. The
Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 452–61.
D. M. Armstrong has objected that the
Dispositionalist theory of laws and properties is modally
inverted, for it entails that properties are constituted by
relations to non-actual possibilia. I contend that, if this
objection succeeds against Dispositionalism, then Armstrong's
nomic necessitation relation is also modally inverted.
- Lange on
essentialism, counterfactuals, and explanation.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 81–5.
Marc Lange objects to scientific essentialists that
they can give no better account of the counterfactual
invariance of laws than Humeans. While conceding this
point succeeds ad hominem against some
essentialists, I show that it does not undermine
essentialism in general. Moreover, Lange's own account of
the relation between laws and counterfactuals is –
with minor modification – compatible with
essentialism.
- Counterlegals and necessary
laws. The Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004):
402–19.
Necessitarian accounts of the laws of nature have
an apparent difficulty in accounting for counterlegal
conditionals because, despite appearing to be substantive,
on the necessitarian thesis they are vacuous. I argue that
the necessitarian may explain the apparently substantive
content of such conditionals by pointing out the
presuppositions of counterlegal discourse. The typical
presupposition is that a certain conceptual possibility
has been realized; namely, that necessitarianism is false.
(The idea of conceptual possibility is explicated in terms
of recent work in two-dimensional modal
semantics.)
- Dispositional essentialism and the possibility of a
law-abiding miracle. The Philosophical Quarterly 51
(2001): 484–94.
I argue that the possibility of spontaneous events
is compatible with the central theses of Dispositional
essentialism. These events constitute, in effect,
"law-abiding miracles". Such miracles are useful because
they allow Dispositional essentialists to avail themselves
of Lewis-style possible-worlds semantics for
counterfactuals.
- Order and affray: Defensive privileges in warfare. (Co-authored with Patrick Emerton.) Philosophy and Public Affairs (forthcoming).
This paper defends some features of traditional jus
in bello, by appealing to two main ideas: (i)
individual privileges of self-defence in contexts of
affray, and (ii) the peculiar role of institutions in
the context of modern warfare.
-
Finking Frankfurt. (Co-authored
with Daniel Cohen.) Philosophical Studies 135
(2007): 363–74. [published
article]
Michael Smith has resisted Frankfurt's claim that moral
responsibility does not require the ability to have done
otherwise. He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the
ability to do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition
that has been "finked" or masked by other factors. We suggest
that, while Smith's account appears to work for some classic
Frankfurt cases, it does not work for all. In particular, Smith
cannot explain cases, such as the Willing Addict, where the
Frankfurt device – e.g. the addiction – is intrinsic
to the agent.
- Is the
risk–liability thesis compatible with negligence law?
(Co-authored with Trevor Pisciotta). Legal Theory 11 (2005):
387–404.
David McCarthy has recently suggested that our
compensation and liability practices may be interpreted as
reflecting a fundamental norm to hold people liable for
imposing risk of harm on others. Independently, closely
related ideas have been criticised by Stephen R. Perry and
Arthur Ripstein as incompatible with central features of
negligence law. We aim to show that these objections are
unsuccessful against McCarthy’s Risk–liability
theory, and that such an approach is a promising means
both for understanding the moral basis of liability for
negligence and for reasoning about possible reforms of the
institution of negligence law.
- Nozick, prohibition, and no-fault
motor insurance. Journal of Applied Philosophy 20
(2003): 201–8.
Is a Nozickian theory of rights compatible with a no-fault
motor insurance scheme? I say, Yes. The argument turns on an
explication of the basis on which a Nozickian justifies the
prohibition of merely risky activities.
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Department of Philosophy, Monash University.