Research areas
Miscellany
The papers provided here are either works in progress or final
drafts before publication. For citation purposes, please seek
permission or refer to published version.
If no link provided to online version, the paper may still be available
on request.
- The Metaphysics of Dispositions and Causes. In Dispositions and
Causes, ed. T. Handfield. Oxford: OUP, forthcoming in 2009.
This article gives a general overview of recent metaphysical
work on dispositional properties and causal relations. It serves as
an introduction to the forthcoming volume, Dispositions and
Causes, which includes contributions from Stephen Barker, Alexander
Bird, Nancy Cartwright, Richard Corry, Antony
Eagle, Marc Lange, Jennifer
McKitrick, Tim O'Connor, and Ann Whittle.
- Humean Dispositionalism. Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 113–26.
Humean metaphysics is characterised by a rejection of
necessary connections between distinct existences.
Dispositionalists claim that there are basic causal powers. The
existence of such properties is widely held to be incompatible with
the Humean rejection of necessary connections. In this paper I
present a novel theory of causal powers that vindicates the
dispositionalist claim that causal powers are basic, without
embracing brute necessary connections. The key assumptions of the
theory are that there are natural types of causal processes, and
that manifestations of powers are identified with certain kinds of
causal processes. From these assumptions, the modal features of
powers are explained in terms of internal relations between powers
themselves and the process-types in which powers are
manifested.
- Dispositions,
Rules, and Finks
. (Co-authored with Alexander Bird.)
Philosophical Studies. Forthcoming.
This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional
solution to the Kripke–Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent
attempts to employ dispositional approaches to this puzzle have
appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes – interfering
dispositions and conditions – to explain why the rule-following
disposition is not always manifested.We argue that this approach
fails: agents cannot be supposed to have straightforward
dispositions to follow a rule which are in some fashion masked by
other, contrary dispositions of the agent, because in all cases, at
least some of the interfering dispositions are both relatively
permanent and intrinsic to the agent. The presence of these
intrinsic and relatively permanent states renders the ascription of
a rule-following disposition to the agent false.
- Unfinkable dispositions
. Synthese
160 (2008): 297–308.
This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional
properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears
the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical
properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks and
antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not
susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by
intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility
that some dispositions – those which lack any causal basis – may
be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks and
antidotes are a major obstacle to a conditional analysis of
dispositions, these dispositions that are unfinkable may be
successfully analysed by the conditional analysis of dispositions.
This result is of importance for those who think that the
fundamental properties might be dispositions which lack any
distinct causal basis, because it suggests that these properties,
if they exist, can be analysed by simple conditionals and that they
will not be subject to ceteris paribus laws.
- The metaphysics of causal models: Where's the
biff? (Co-authored with Charles Twardy, Kevin Korb,
and Graham Oppy.) Erkenntnis
68 (2008): 149–68.
This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of
causal processes – of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil
Dowe – into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We
suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible
causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are
rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths,
the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc.
These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late
preëmption and other cases that have proved problematic for
causal models.
- Armstrong and the modal inversion of
dispositions. The Philosophical Quarterly 55
(2005): 452–61.
D. M. Armstrong has objected that the Dispositionalist
theory of laws and properties is modally inverted, for it entails
that properties are constituted by relations to non-actual
possibilia. I contend that, if this objection succeeds against
Dispositionalism, then Armstrong's nomic necessitation relation is
also modally inverted. This shows that at least one of
Armstrong's reasons for preferring a nomic necessitation theory is
specious.
- Lange on
essentialism, counterfactuals, and explanation.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 81–5.
Marc Lange objects to scientific essentialists that they can
give no better account of the counterfactual invariance of laws
than Humeans. While conceding this point succeeds ad
hominem against some essentialists, I show that it does not
undermine essentialism in general. Moreover, Lange's own account of
the relation between laws and counterfactuals is – with minor
modification – compatible with essentialism.
- Counterlegals and necessary
laws. The Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004):
402–19.
Necessitarian accounts of the laws of nature have an
apparent difficulty in accounting for counterlegal conditionals
because, despite appearing to be substantive, on the necessitarian
thesis they are vacuous. I argue that the necessitarian may
explain the apparently substantive content of such conditionals by
pointing out the presuppositions of counterlegal discourse. The
typical presupposition is that a certain conceptual possibility has
been realized; namely, that necessitarianism is false. (The idea
of conceptual possibility is explicated in terms of recent work in
two-dimensional modal semantics.) If this sort of presupposition
is made explicit in counterlegal utterances, we obtain a sentence
such as: 'If it turns out that the laws of nature are contingent,
then if the laws had been otherwise, then such and such would have
been the case.' Sentences of this type are non-vacuous, and very
often true. I argue that this goes a long way towards resolving
the difficulty for necessitarianism.
- Dispositional essentialism and the possibility of a
law-abiding miracle. The Philosophical Quarterly 51
(2001): 484–94.
I argue that the possibility of spontaneous events is
compatible with the central theses of Dispositional essentialism.
These events constitute, in effect, "law-abiding miracles". Such
miracles are useful because they allow Dispositional essentialists
to avail themselves of Lewis-style possible-worlds semantics for
counterfactuals.
- Token causation by probabilistic active
paths. (Co-authored with Charles Twardy, Kevin Korb, and
Graham Oppy.) Undergoing revision – do not cite without
permission.
We present a probabilistic extension to active path analyses
of token causation (Halpern & Pearl 2001, forthcoming; Hitchcock
2001). The extension uses the generalized notion of intervention
presented in (Korb et al. 2004): we allow an intervention to set
any probability distribution over the intervention variables, not
just a single value. The resulting account can handle a wide range
of examples. We do not claim the account is complete -- only that
it fills an obvious gap in previous active-path approaches. It
still succumbs to recent counterexamples by Hiddleston (2005),
because it does not explicitly consider causal processes. We claim
three benefits: a detailed comparison of three active-path
approaches, a probabilistic extension for each, and an algorithmic
formulation.
- Finking
Frankfurt. (Co-authored with Daniel Cohen.)
Philosophical Studies 135 (2007): 363–74. [published
article]
Michael Smith has resisted Frankfurt's claim that moral
responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise.
He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the ability to
do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition that has been
"finked" or masked by other factors. We suggest that, while Smith's
account appears to work for some classic Frankfurt cases, it does
not work for all. In particular, Smith cannot explain cases, such
as the Willing Addict, where the Frankfurt device – e.g. the
addiction – is intrinsic to the agent.
- Is the
risk–liability thesis compatible with negligence law?
(Co-authored with Trevor Pisciotta). Legal Theory 11 (2005):
387–404.
David McCarthy has recently suggested that our compensation
and liability practices may be interpreted as reflecting a
fundamental norm to hold people liable for imposing risk of harm on
others. Independently, closely related ideas have been criticised
by Stephen R. Perry and Arthur Ripstein as incompatible with
central features of negligence law. We aim to show that these
objections are unsuccessful against McCarthy’s
Risk–liability theory, and that such an approach is a
promising means both for understanding the moral basis of liability
for negligence and for reasoning about possible reforms of the
institution of negligence law.
- Defence and preservation. In progress.
This paper offers a unified account of (i) the right
to use violence in self-defence and (ii) the permissibility
of harming others in cases of preservation, such as Trolley cases.
- Rights, legal and
moral: You say either, she says neither – let's call the
whole thing off. Draft.
Judith Thomson (1990) says it is "unhelpful" to distinguish
between legal and moral rights in such a way as to imply that these
are distinct species. I attempt to elucidate her reasons for this
view.
- Nozick, prohibition, and no-fault
motor insurance. Journal of Applied Philosophy 20
(2003): 201–8.
Is a Nozickian theory of rights compatible with a no-fault
motor insurance scheme? I say, Yes. The argument turns on an
explication of the basis on which a Nozickian justifies the
prohibition of merely risky activities.
Comments on any of the above most welcome. Email me at toby
handfield AT arts monash edu au.
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Department of Philosophy, Monash University.